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CLASSICAL 
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
Richard Samuels
Introduction
In this chapter I discuss a familiar class of computational models that have played an influential 
role in artificial intelligence, computational psychology, and cognitive science – what are often 
called “classical” or “symbolic” models. In Section 1, I characterize such models, and discuss 
their relationship to some closely associated ideas. In Section 2, I sketch some putative virtues 
of classical models. In Section 3, I discuss some of the dimensions along which these models 
vary, and provide brief illustrations. Finally, in Section 4, I mention some of the more prominent 
criticisms levelled against the classical modeling paradigm.
1 What is a classical computational model?
The expression “classical computation” only became common currency in cognitive science 
during the 1980s, largely as a means of contrasting the symbolic tradition with the burgeoning 
field of connectionist cognitive science (Rumelhardt, McClelland, and the PDP Research 
Group, 1986; Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988). However, the conception of computation it designates 
had been influential in AI since the 1950s, and has roots tracing back at least as far as Turing’s 
research in the 1930s (Boden, 2006). Because of this complex history, it is important to distin-
guish the notion of a classical computational model from a range of associated ideas.
1.1 Classical computational models as a species of process model
There are many kinds of models in cognitive science. For example, some seek to characterize 
the evolution of a given psychological capacity (Barrett, 2014; Henrich and Tennie, 2017); 
others model statistical or causal dependencies between salient variables (Ratcliff et al., 2016); 
and still others seek to make precise some psychologically significant relationship, such as simi-
larity (Tversky, 1977). However, the prototypical kind of cognitive models – what are often called 
“process models” – are primarily oriented towards addressing a kind of how- question. Roughly 
put: How does human performance (in a particular domain of cognition) come about? Further, 
the manner in which they seek to answer such questions can be characterized in terms of their 
target phenomena, and the sorts of features they attribute to their targets:
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• Targets: Such models purport to explain human performance by characterizing the processes 
involved in the exercise of some cognitive capacity, or the operation of some functionally 
characterized cognitive system(s).
• Features: These targets are characterized in terms of a combination of familiar kinds of psy-
chological construct:  representations; cognitive operations that effect transitions between 
representational states; and cognitively salient resources, such as memory space, attention, and 
time (Weiskopf, 2017).
As with all scientific models, cognitive models can be formulated with the aid of quite different 
representational resources. That is, the modeling vehicles can be of different sorts. For example, 
there are verbal models formulated in a natural language, no doubt supplemented by various 
pieces of jargon. There are mathematical models, which paradigmatically take the form of an 
equation or inequality in some mathematical formalism. There are diagrammatic models; and 
most importantly for our purposes, there are computational models where the target aspects of 
cognition are modeled by a computational system that permits dynamic simulation of the target 
phenomena. Classical computational models (CCMs), in the sense most relevant to the present 
chapter, are a species of computational, process model.1
1.2 Core characteristics of classical models
CCMs are best construed as a broad family of process models that share a core set of 
characteristics. Perhaps the most obvious is that, qua modeling vehicles, CCMs are computational 
systems – paradigmatically, suites of programs run on an ordinary, commercial, digital computer. 
Yet this is not, of course, a distinctive feature of CCMs, since all computational models take this 
form. What is distinctive of CCMs is that they characterize their targets as computational systems 
of a particular sort. Slightly more precisely, CCMs represent cognitive processes and systems as 
involving a kind of algorithmically specifiable symbol manipulation. What follows is a fairly typical 
way of spelling out the core aspects of this sort of computation.
Symbolic. If cognition is to be characterized in terms of symbol manipulation, one needs symbols. 
Symbols are representations in that they have semantic properties – e.g. they denote or refer. In 
addition, however, they are much like natural language expressions in that they possess formal or 
syntactic properties, and belong to a system of representations, akin to a language. Such symbol 
systems invariably contain both primitive symbols, which have no other symbols as parts, and 
complex symbols built up from primitive ones. Further, these symbol systems are characterized 
by sets of rules – typically recursive in form – that specify which combinations of symbols are 
well- formed or grammatical, and also assign meanings to both primitive and well- formed com-
binations of symbols. In short, symbolic representational systems of the sort relevant to classical 
computation possess a combinatorial syntax and semantics in much the same way as logical 
systems, and natural languages, do (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988). For this reason, classical models 
are sometimes called language of thought models (Fodor, 1975).
Algorithmic. In addition to syntactic and semantic rules, which define a symbol system, classical 
computation also presupposes a set of rules, or instructions, which specify algorithms for how 
these symbols are to be manipulated. An algorithm is a precise, stepwise procedure for doing 
something – of performing a mapping from a class of inputs (the domain) to a class of outputs 
(the range).2 That is, it’s a way of computing a function. Thus, CCMs seek to characterize cogni-
tive processes as algorithmically specifiable processes for computing functions.
Formal. A third assumption embodied in CCMs is that the relevant class of algorithms are formal 
in that the operations specified by the algorithm are defined with respect to the syntactic, as 
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opposed to semantic, properties of symbols. In this regard, they are akin to familiar grade- school 
algorithms for multiplication and long division, which are formulated in terms of operations 
on formally characterized items – Arabic numerals – and not the things they represent – i.e. 
numbers. One consequence of this is that the task of classically modeling a cognitive process 
is entwined with the task of specifying the formal properties of the representations involved. 
Change the symbol system – e.g. from Arabic to Roman numerals – and one must typically 
change the algorithm as well.
Interpretable. A  final core feature of CCMs is that they characterize cognitive processes 
assemantically interpretable. Although cognitive processes are modeled by formal procedures, the 
symbols involved have semantic properties as well. As a consequence, it is possible to make 
sense of – to interpret – the process, not merely as the manipulation of formal tokens, but as 
mappings from meaningful states to other meaningful states. To return to the example of grade- 
school arithmetic, although the algorithm for multiplication is specified in term of operations 
on Arabic numerals, the symbol transitions that occur can be systematically interpreted in terms 
of the numbers represented – i.e. as finding the product of two or more numbers.
1.3 Classical models and “Turing computation”
In addition to the above four features, CCMs are sometimes attributed other characteristics 
that are incorrectly presumed to be essential. Some of these false presumptions are, I suspect, a 
consequence of misunderstanding the idea that classicists seek to model “the mind as a Turing 
machine”, or that they “attempt to fit the facts of human cognition to the classical, Turing 
account of computation” (Fodor, 2001, p. 5).
Turing’s research is, of course, extraordinarily influential, in part because it provides a theor-
etically perspicuous model of (classical) computation. However, CCMs need not – and should 
not – attribute all the properties of Turing machines to cognitive systems. First, CCMs invariably 
make different assumptions about the nature of memory. The memory in a Turing machine – 
the tape – is infinite and unaddressable. In contrast, and for obvious reasons, CCMs do not 
characterize human memory as infinite; and they almost invariably assume – though often only 
tacitly – that cognition relies on addressable memory systems (Gallistel and King, 2010).
Second, Turing machines are serial processors, but CCMs need not characterize their targets 
in this way.3 Admittedly some highly influential classical cognitive scientists have viewed seriality 
as an important property of human cognition (e.g. Simon, 1962). Nevertheless, many acknow-
ledge that classical computations can have parallel implementations (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988; 
Gallistel and King, 2010). So, for example, more recent versions of Newell and Laird’s SOAR 
implements symbolic processes, such as production rule activation, in parallel (Ritter, 2005).
Finally, a Turing machine is deterministic in the sense that at any point in a procedure, there 
is at most one unique next operation it can perform. In contrast, CCMs need not charac-
terize cognition as deterministic. For example, they may posit stochastic processes that involve 
random number generation, or concurrent operations – both of which suffice for a process 
being nondeterministic in the relevant sense.
1.4 Classical models and Marr’s levels
There is a longstanding tradition in cognitive science of characterizing models or explanations 
with reference to some hierarchy of levels. The best- known is David Marr’s tri- level hier-
archy, which I discuss here because it is often construed as a framework for classical modeling 
(Marr, 1982).
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Suppose we seek to characterize some cognitive process or system. Then, each of Marr’s level 
can be characterized by proprietary research questions that require the provision of distinct sorts 
of descriptions:
• C- Level: Computational level descriptions seek to characterize what function, or mapping, 
the system computes, and why.
• A- Level:  Algorithmic level descriptions seek to characterize how the computation is 
performed by specifying (a)  the class of symbols that are inputs to and outputs from the 
system; and (b) the algorithm(s) by which this transformation is accomplished.
• I- Level:  Implementation level descriptions seek to characterize the physical organization 
which enables the cognitive process or system to be implemented.
Whether Marr’s hierarchy is exhaustive is a matter of some theoretical debate (Peebles and 
Cooper, 2015). However, the tri- level hierarchy provides a useful way of bringing out certain 
typical characteristics of classical models.
First, of the three levels, CCMs are clearly best construed as A- level descriptions since they 
aim to characterize cognitive systems in terms of the algorithmic manipulation of symbols. 
Second, and relatedly, this observation allows us to see that classical and non- classical cognitive 
models need not always be incompatible with each other. For example, it may be that some 
connectionist models are best construed as I- level descriptions, which purport to explain how 
classical processes might be implemented in the brain (Pinker and Prince, 1988).
Third, since Marr’s time, it has become widely accepted by modelers that C- level analyses 
are critically important to the development of process models – especially CCMs. Among other 
things, this is because, as Marr stressed, the appropriateness of any given algorithm depends 
crucially on the nature of the computational problem to be solved (e.g. Griffiths, Lieder, and 
Goodman, 2015; Bringsjord, 2008b). This was not, however, always a dominant view amongst 
classicists. Indeed, Marr’s motivation for introducing the tri- level hypothesis was to correct what 
he saw as a major deficiency in the research of his day: a tendency to produce process models 
without any serious effort at developing rigorous C- level analyses.
Finally, it is worth noting that, as a matter of fact, classical modelers have given far less 
attention to I- level considerations than to C- level ones. In some cases, this is due to a paucity of 
relevant I- level information. In other cases, it is a consequence of adopting formalisms that do 
not readily map onto extant neuroscience (Bringsjord, 2008b).
1.5 Classical models and the computational theory of mind
Historically, a central motivation for classical modeling is the endorsement of the classical com-
putational theory of mind (Samuels, 2010; Rescorla, 2015). Though formulated in different ways, 
the rough idea is this:
CCTM: The mind is literally a classical computational system – an interpretable, formal, symbol 
manipulator – of some sort; and cognitive processes, such as reasoning and visual perception, 
just are classical computational processes of some sort.
So construed, CCTM is a kind of empirically motivated, metaphysical doctrine, in that it provides 
a general characterization of what it is to be a mind, or cognitive process (Fodor, 1975; though 
see Piccinini, 2010, for an alternative construal of CCTM). Moreover, it is a view that has had 
some highly influential advocates – e.g. Fodor, Pylyshyn, and Gallistel explicitly endorse the 
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view, and Newell and Simon’s physical symbol systems hypothesis is a close cousin (Newell and 
Simon, 1976).
The relationship between CCTM and the classical modeling strategy is a complex one. 
Clearly, they dovetail with each other. Historically, adherence to CCTM has been a major 
motivation for developing classical models. Moreover, various kinds of predictive and explana-
tory success in developing classical models may, in turn, provide support for the doctrine itself.
Nevertheless, it is important to see that classical modelers need not incur a commitment to 
CCTM – they need not be doctrinal in this way. CCTM is a general thesis regarding the nature 
of mind and cognition, and CCMs might be scientifically useful even if this general thesis is false. 
First, it might be that our minds are hybrid systems, as some dual process theorists have claimed, 
where only some cognitive systems are as classicists suppose (Sloman, 1996; see also Anderson, 
2007). Alternatively, even if CCTM is entirely inadequate as a metaphysics of mind, CCMs might 
still be (causal) explanatory at some appropriate level of granularity. (Compare: electrical circuit 
theory is explanatory in cellular neuroscience, even though no one maintains that neurons just 
are electrical circuits.) Finally, even if CCMs fail to explain human cognition, they might still be 
useful for other purposes, such as addressing “how- possibly” questions of various sorts.
To summarize: Though the success of the classical modeling enterprise obviously fits well 
with CCTM, modelers need not be committed to this doctrine since the provision CCMs 
might be scientifically valuable even if CCTM is false. In Section 3, I will suggest that more 
recent classical modeling is sometimes of this non- doctrinal variety.
2 Virtues of classical models
Why suppose the goals of cognitive science are fruitfully pursued by developing CCMs? For 
heuristic purposes, I divide the reasons into two sorts: (a) general methodological virtues, and 
(b)  respects in which CCMs appear peculiarly suited to characterizing aspects of cognition. 
Whether any of these putative virtues are unique to CCMs is an issue of longstanding and 
ongoing disagreement, which I won’t take up here.
2.1 General methodological virtues
Over the past sixty years or so, researchers have claimed that computational models in gen-
eral, and CCMs in particular, can play a significant role in addressing various methodological 
concerns in the cognitive and behavioral sciences, including the following:
Prediction and testability. Computational models in general, and CCMs in particular, are useful 
in that they can generate testable predictions. In particular, they allow for the generation of 
predictions under different input conditions that can be tested against behavior data.
Avoiding under- specification. Computational modeling requires that researchers be explicit about 
the assumptions they make. This is especially important in the context of psychological science 
where, as behaviorists were fond of stressing, much of what passes for theory can be woefully 
underspecified. Of particular concern is the risk of “explanations” that posit undischarged “hom-
unculi” – sub- processes or sub- systems – that do not so much explain as presuppose the target 
phenomenon. CCMs help ameliorate this concern because they require the specification and 
implementation of an algorithmic process. In doing so, they leave nowhere for homunculi to hide.
Avoiding vacuity. Another common behaviorist concern is that intentional psychological 
explanations may sometimes appear empty because they are too easily generated. Whatever 
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the behavior we seek to understand, it’s effortless to retrofit the unobserved mental causes 
to “explain” it. As Pylyshyn and others note, however, if one demands that psychological 
explanations take the form of precisely articulated procedures – implementable in the form 
of programs – this complaint no longer seems plausible. Indeed, far from being too easy, the 
problem is often that it is too hard to develop such models (Pylyshyn, 1984).
Addressing “how”- questions. Many of the most pressing issues in the cognitive and behavioral 
sciences concern the explanation of capacities with which we are already intimately familiar. Put 
a neurotypical subject in front of a tree under normal lighting conditions, and there’s a good 
chance that they will see a tree. Ask such a subject what they see, and there’s a good chance 
that they’ll be able to tell you. The principle challenge for psychology is not merely to docu-
ment such regularities, but to explain how instances of such regularities reliably occur. Process 
models quite generally seek to address such questions, by characterizing the state transitions 
between initial conditions (e.g. sensory inputs) and a given cognitive or behavioral outcome. 
CCMs are process models that achieve this goal by specifying a precise stepwise procedure for 
effecting such transitions. To that extent, they are appropriate for addressing the core explana-
tory challenge of cognitive science.
Addressing “how- possibly”- questions. There’s a well- known and philosophically deeper reason for 
finding CCMs attractive. Contemporary research on human behavior and cognition occurs 
within the context of some widespread assumptions that are not easily reconciled. On the one 
hand, it is almost universally assumed amongst behavioral scientists that human beings are com-
plex physical systems. On the other hand, there is widespread consensus that human behavior 
is at least partially explained by representational processes. In view of this, perhaps the deepest 
motivation for the classical modeling strategy is that it provides a framework within which 
these commitments can be reconciled (Haugeland, 1989; Pinker, 2000). CCMs provide existence 
proofs of complex, semantically interpretable physical systems, and in doing so suggest answers 
to longstanding questions regarding how it is possible for physical systems to exhibit the sorts 
of psychological capacities we possess.
2.2 The peculiar suitability of classical models
In addition to their general methodological virtues, CCMs appear peculiarly suitable for mod-
eling some apparently pervasive psychological phenomena.
Modeling inferential processes. Closely related to the last point in Section 2.1., many psycho-
logical processes appear both causal and inferential. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of 
reasoning, where earlier beliefs are not only causally related to later ones, but also semantically 
related in such a way that the former provide premises for the latter. Yet this phenomenon 
seems not to be restricted to reasoning. For example, much of our best perceptual psychology 
proceeds on the assumption that vision, audition, and the like involve “unconscious inference” 
(Helmholtz, 1867; Scholl, 2005; Olshausen, 2014).
Historically, the inferential character of many psychological processes was perceived 
as posing a serious challenge:  a version of the notorious homunculus regress. To explain such 
rational- cum- causal relations, it seems that meanings themselves must be causally efficacious, 
which in turn appears to require some inner interpreter – an intelligent subsystem, or homun-
culus – for which thoughts have meanings. But then the same problem of coordinating semantic 
and causal relations recurs for the homunculus, resulting in a regress of interpreters. Classical 
modelers address this problem by rejecting the assumption that rational causation is explicable 
only if meanings are causally efficacious. Instead they invoke an idea familiar to logicians, that 
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inferences can be characterized in terms of formal rules. (Modus ponens is a simple example.) 
When applied to the task of understanding cognition, the idea is that mental processes are 
inferential not because of any unexplained sensitivity to meanings, but because they depend on 
formal rules which, though defined over the syntax of representations, are like logical rules in 
that they preserve semantic relations. Moreover, since CCMs characterize cognitive processes 
algorithmically, they are ultimately decomposable into combinations of operations the execu-
tion of which requires no intelligence at all. We are thus able to explain the inferential character 
of cognitive processes without succumbing to regress.
Productivity and systematicity. CCMs are often regarded as suited to modeling aspects of cognition 
that are productive or systematic (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988). This plausibly includes language 
comprehension and production, planning, deductive reasoning, and perhaps perceptual capaci-
ties, such as vision. Roughly put, such cognitive capacities are productive at least in the sense that 
they permit the production of a great many distinct thoughts, many of which are novel. Further, 
such regions of cognition seem systematic, in roughly the sense that the salient representational 
capacities come in coherent packages. In particular, the ability to be in some cognitive states 
appears to reliably covary with the ability to be in other semantically related states. To use a 
well- worn example: so far as we know, there is no- one who can understand the sentence “Mary 
loves John” and yet lacks the ability to understand the sentence “John loves Mary”. The cap-
acity to understand the one, reliably covaries with the capacity to understand the other. Mutatis 
mutandis for a great many cognitive states. Or so it would appear.
Classical modelers have a general approach to modeling systematicity and productivity. In 
brief, part of the solution is that CCMs are specified relative to a recursively defined com-
binatorial system of syntactically structured representations. Further, the algorithmic processes 
defined over this system invariably involve combinatorial operations, sensitive only to the syntax 
of these representations. In view of this, it is relatively easy to accommodate productive processes 
because, under minimal assumptions, the system of representations is potentially infinite, and 
the model has the resources to generate increasingly more complex symbolic structures via the 
combination of simpler ones. Systematicity is similarly easy to accommodate. If combinatorial 
operations are defined over syntactic forms, syntactically similar representations will be treated 
in similar fashion, even where they differ semantically. To return to the well- worn example of 
“John” and “Mary”: Assuming that “John loves Mary” and “Mary loves John” involve the same 
symbols and share the same syntax, if one of them is producible by the model, then, (given min-
imal assumptions) so too will the other. This is because the very same computational resources 
are required for the production of either.
Variables and quantification. Human beings engage in a wide array of cognitive tasks that are 
readily modeled in terms of operations on variables, often bound by quantifiers. This is per-
haps most obvious in the case of natural language, but it appears to occur in a great many other 
tasks as well, including deductive reasoning, planning, and mathematical cognition. Further, 
much inductive learning appears to consist in learning the relationships between variables. For 
example, we are able to learn what Marcus (2001) called “universally quantified, one- to- one 
mappings”, such as identity. These tasks are naturally modeled within the classical framework 
because variables and quantifiers are readily accommodated within a symbol system, and much 
classical computation involves operations over such variable structures.
One- shot learning. Human beings engage in various forms of one- shot learning that can exert 
a significant influence on both our overt behavior and inferential tendencies. Most obviously, 
this occurs when we acquire new factual information via natural language. As Griffiths et al. 
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(2010) note, “to a child who believes that dolphins are fish, hearing a simple message from a 
knowledgeable adult (‘dolphins might look like fish but are actually mammals’) might drastic-
ally modify the inferences she makes”. This sort of phenomenon is readily modeled as relying 
on explicit representations of the sort assumed by classical models. In contrast, it is far from 
obvious how to accommodate this phenomenon within other modeling frameworks, such as 
connectionism.
Cognitive flexibility: Amongst the most striking features of human cognition is its flexibility. To 
a first approximation, we appear capable of performing an indefinite range of qualitatively dis-
tinct tasks. Or, as Allen Newell once put it: we exhibit a kind of unlimited qualitative adaptation 
(Newell, 1990). One early and powerful motivation for the classical modeling paradigm is that 
it suggests an elegant account of this phenomenon. Classical computational systems can exhibit 
this sort of flexibility in that they can execute different sets of instructions designed for different 
tasks. Faced with the task of explaining human cognitive flexibility, some researchers suggest 
that a similar account may hold for human cognition as well – that much of our flexibility 
results from our possession of cognitive mechanisms that are capable of exploiting different 
bodies of task- relevant procedural knowledge (Newell, 1990).
3 Varieties of classical computational modeling: some illustrations
So far, we have discussed the characteristics, and general virtues, of CCMs. However, different 
families of classical models have been developed within research programs that vary consider-
ably in their methodological and empirical commitments. As a consequence, there is consid-
erable variation in the sorts of models – and broader modeling practices – which exist within 
classical paradigms. In what follows, I briefly discuss some of these approaches.
3.1 Heuristic search: early exemplars of classical modeling
Early research by Newell, Simon, and their collaborators aimed not only to provide workable 
bits of technology, but also to model how human beings solve various cognitive tasks. In add-
ition to possessing the core features of CCMs, programs such as the Logic Theorist and the 
General Problem Solver (or GPS) incorporated a pair of additional assumptions that exerted 
a profound influence on subsequent research in AI and cognitive science (Newell and Simon, 
1956; 1961).
The first of these assumptions is that much human cognition involves a kind of mental 
search through a space of options – a search space – in order to find a solution to the task at 
hand. Moreover, since the search space for interesting tasks is almost invariably too large to 
permit exhaustive search, Newell and Simon further proposed that search needs to be heuris-
tically constrained. That is, the model needs to encode various guidelines or “rules of thumb” 
which constrain the range of options that need be considered in the course of solving the task 
at hand. For example, GPS used a kind of search heuristic known as means- end analysis, which 
aims to produce convergence on solution to a problem by successively reducing the difference 
between the current state of the system and the goal state.
Within AI the ideas found in Newell and Simon’s early work spurred extensive research on 
heuristic search (see Russell and Norvig, 2010, chs. 3– 5), and was instrumental in the devel-
opment of planning systems, such as STRIPS, which relied on the notions of means- ends ana-
lysis and search (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971). Planning research, though dramatically transformed, 
remains a highly active region of AI (Ghallab, Nau and Traverso, 2016).
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From the vantage of contemporary cognitive science, models such as GPS may appear 
quaint. Nevertheless, the idea that cognition relies on heuristic methods remains an influ-
ential one. For example, the “Ecological Rationality” research program, initiated by Gerd 
Gigerenzer and Peter Todd, relies heavily on the notion of heuristic processes in order 
to explain our capacity to make decisions in a computationally efficient manner (Todd, 
Gigerenzer, and the ABC Research Group, 2012). Moreover, whilst not doctrinally committed 
to a classical view of cognition, many of their models possess the core characteristics of 
CCMs. This is true, for example, of Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s well- known model of the 
Take- the- Best heuristic, which (roughly) decides between two options – e.g. which of two 
cities is larger – by using the most valid available discriminating cue, and ignoring the rest 
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1999).
3.2 Logicism
A second illustration of classical modeling is the logic- based or logicist approach. Though it 
played a prominent role in the development of AI and continues to spur research in applied 
logic, its influence in contemporary cognitive science is diminished. (For overviews, see Minker, 
2000; Bringsjord, 2008a; and Thomason, 2016.)
Starting in the 1950s with the seminal work of John McCarthy and his collaborators, logicists 
proposed that many of the cognitive problems we confront are fruitfully construed as problems 
of logical inference (McCarthy, 1959). In slightly more detail, logicists maintain that propos-
itional attitudes – mental states, such as beliefs, judgments, and intentions – are central to human 
cognition, and that many cognitive processes consist in inferential transitions between such 
attitudes. In paradigmatic instances of reasoning, for example, one starts with a set of premise 
beliefs, and infers a conclusion; and when planning one infers new intentions from prior goals, 
intentions, and beliefs.
If one thinks of cognition in the above way, then formal logic appears directly rele-
vant. In particular, proof theory promises to provide the relevant resources for formally 
characterizing cognitive tasks in terms of inferential relations between propositional – or 
declarative – representations.
In terms of Marr’s levels, logicism is naturally characterized by the following division of 
labor. At the C- level, logical formalization is used in order to provide precise specifications 
of the inferential problems that we solve – e.g. narrative understanding, or spatial reasoning 
(Thomason, 2016).4 In view of the range and complexity of the problems we solve, this has 
resulted in significant developments in formal logic itself, including nonmonotonic logics 
(Antonelli, 2012), logics for spatial reasoning (Stock, 1997), and logics for temporal reasoning 
(Ghallab, Nau, and Traverso, 2016).
At the A- level, the core task for logicists is to provide computationally efficient 
implementations of the solutions specified at the C- level. Though different kinds of imple-
mentation are possible, in practice they typically consist in a kind of mechanized proof theory, 
where relevant information is represented by formulae in a logical language, and computation 
proceeds by the operation of a theorem- prover, so that new representations can be derived from 
existing ones, via the application of proof- theoretic rules (Chater and Oaksford, 1991).
Within contemporary AI, perhaps the most well- known example of a logic- based system 
is Doug Lenat’s monumental CYC system, which aims to codify, in machine- usable form, the 
millions of items of information that constitute human commonsense (Lenat et  al., 1990). 
Within contemporary cognitive science, logic- based models are less commonplace than they 
once were. Nevertheless, they are found in various fields of research, such as computational 
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linguistics and the psychology of reasoning. For example, Lance Rips PSYCOP is a well- known 
logic- based model of human deductive reasoning (Rips, 1994). In addition, production systems, 
such as SOAR and ACT- R – of which more below – bear close ties to logic- based models 
(Bringsjord, 2008b).
3.3 Cognitive architectures
A third example of classical research concerns the characterization of cognitive architecture. 
Although such architectural models take the form of working computer systems, they possess a 
pair of features not typical of CCMs in general.
First, in contrast to many CCMs, which tend to target relatively narrow aspects of cogni-
tion, models of cognitive architecture seek to provide a comprehensive, detailed specification 
of how cognition operates across a wide range of domains and tasks. In Newell’s (1990) mem-
orable phrase, they are intended to provide “unified theories of cognition”. Further, since such 
models are typically motivated by the idea that much human behavior is a product of complex 
interactions between systems, they typically specify a variety of systems – e.g. for different sorts 
of memory, and for different sorts of cognitive process.
Second, in contrast to many CCMs, architectural models pursue the ambitious project of 
specifying the core set of basic computational operations, structures, and resources on which 
cognition depends. To put the point metaphorically, they purport to specify the sorts of proper-
ties that would be described in a “user’s manual” for the cognitive system (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 
1988). Such properties are assumed to be basic in at least two senses. First, they are presumed 
to be relatively invariant over the lifespan of the agent. Second, they are typically assumed to 
be properties of the mind that are presupposed – but not explained – by one’s classical account 
of cognition. As a consequence, it is typically assumed that the explanation of these properties 
requires recourse to some “lower”- level science, such as neurobiology or biochemistry. Again, 
none of this is typical of CCMs more generally.
Of course, not all architectural models are classical. For example, Randy O’Reilly’s well- 
known Leabra model specifies a connectionist architecture (O’Reilly, Hazy, and Herd, 2017). 
Nevertheless, since the 1970s, there have been a number of notable efforts to specify cog-
nitive architectures, which are either uniformly classical, or at least hybrid models with 
classical subcomponents. The SOAR architecture, developed by Allen Newell and John 
Laird is a prominent example of the former, and John Anderson’s ACT- R is an influential 
version of the latter (Laird, 2012; Anderson, 2007). Versions of these architectures have been 
around since the 1980s, and have been used to simulate human performance on a broad 
array of tasks, including arithmetic, categorization, video game playing, natural language 
understanding, concept acquisition, verbal reasoning, driving, analogy making, and scientific 
discovery.
Although SOAR and ACT- R are too complex to describe here, it is interesting to note 
that both architectures contain production systems as a core component. Such systems operate 
on if- then rules, known as productions, in which the antecedent of the rule specifies a 
condition (e.g. the knight is on square 8), and the consequent an action to be performed 
when that condition obtains (e.g. move the knight to square 1). Production systems operate 
via the coordination of three sub- systems:  a long- term memory in which the rules are 
stored, a working memory, and an inference engine. A  production rule can be retrieved 
from long- term memory (or “fired”) only if its antecedent condition is met by an element 
in working memory. The task of the inference engine is to determine which of the rules 
have all their conditions met, and then to decide which of these should be fired. Over the 
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years, production systems have had various practical applications  – e.g. in expert systems 
such as Mycin and Dendral. But more importantly for present purposes, they have proven 
exceedingly useful in modeling complex sequences of behavior, such as those that occur in 
problem solving.
3.4 Bayesian modeling
My final illustration of classical modeling may strike readers as an odd one in that Bayesian 
research in cognitive science is not ordinarily construed as a form of classicism. And, indeed, there 
are important differences between Bayesian approaches and the sorts of “good old fashioned” 
cognitive science mentioned above. For one thing, Bayesian cognitive scientists in general have 
no doctrinal commitment to CCTM. For another, in contrast to the classical models of old, it is 
absolutely central to the Bayesian approach that psychological processes are fruitfully construed 
in terms of probabilistic inference of the sort characterized by Bayesian statistics. For all that, some 
of the models and modeling strategies used by Bayesians bear a striking resemblance to more 
traditional classical ones; and for this reason, I suggest that some Bayesian modeling is appropri-
ately construed as a non- doctrinal form of classical modeling.
Although there are currently different forms of Bayesianism in the brain and behavioral 
sciences, researchers in cognitive science typically adopt a methodology, reminiscent of Marr, 
which starts with C- level analyses. Thus, Griffiths et al. (2010) contrast their Bayesian approach 
to that of connectionism, and other “mechanism- first” approaches, by noting:  “probabilistic 
models of cognition pursue a top- down or ‘function- first’ strategy, beginning with abstract 
principles that allow agents to solve problems posed by the world – the functions that minds 
perform (2010, p. 357). In other words, Bayesians typically start by providing a C- level analysis 
of the cognitive task, where they specify the function computed in terms of principles drawn 
from probability theory, such as those involved in sampling and model selection.
To take a well- known example, suppose that we seek to understand the problem of learning 
the extension of new words in the absence of negative evidence. When a child learns the word 
“dog”, for instance, it suffices for a teacher to point to a few positive  examples – a Chihuahua, a 
Shetland Sheepdog, and a Boxer, for  example – and call them each “dog”, without also pointing 
to, say, a horse or a sunflower and saying “That’s not a dog”. Within the Bayesian framework, 
this is naturally construed as a task in which hypotheses are being prioritized according to some 
probabilistic criterion. Thus, Xu and Tenenbaum (2007) propose that this task and its solution 
can be partially characterized by a simple but powerful principle of probabilistic inference – 
the size principle – which says that if you are considering a set of nested hypotheses, you should 
prefer the smallest hypothesis is consistent with the available evidence (Perfors et al., 2011).
Most extant Bayesian research is similar to the above in that it aims to provide C- level analyses 
that specify ideal solutions to computational problems. Moreover, even where algorithmic issues 
arise, Bayesians are not generally committed to a classical modeling strategy. Nevertheless, some 
Bayesian models have a distinctly classical flavor. This is so for a pair of reasons. First, Bayesian 
C- level analyses frequently suggest a role in cognition for complex representational structures 
of the sort most readily accommodated by classical models – e.g. hierarchically structured cat-
egory systems, or tree- structured representations (Griffiths et al., 2010). Second, when seeking 
to explain how ideal solutions might be efficiently approximated by human cognition, Bayesians 
have pursued a strategy of borrowing techniques from theoretical computer science – such as 
Monte Carlo methods – which possess characteristics readily accommodated within a classical 
computational framework – such as variable binding, and compositionally structured hypothesis 
spaces (Griffiths, Kemp, and Tenenbaum, 2008).
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In view of the above, it is perhaps unsurprising that in recent years, some Bayesian researchers 
have described their own approach to cognitive modeling as relying on what the arch classicist, 
Jerry Fodor, called a language of thought (LOT). In its Bayesian incarnation, however, the LOT 
is (of course) probabilistic – a pLOT. Thus, Piantadosi and Jacobs conclude a recent paper by 
articulating a conception of Bayesianism that’s continuous with, whilst improving upon, the 
more traditional symbolic approaches that preceded it:
The pLOT is not a revolutionary new theory that promises to overthrow existing 
paradigms; it is a resurgent old theory that promises to integrate many approaches 
into a unitary framework … we argue that it provides one of the most promising 
frameworks for cognition, combining the compositionality of symbolic approaches 
with the robustness of probabilistic approaches, thereby permitting researchers to for-
mulate and test theories that do not acquiesce to the poles of major debates.
(Piantadosi and Jacobs, 2016)
4 Challenges to classical models
The classical paradigm has been subject to a bewildering array of objections; and though there 
isn’t the space to consider them in detail here, I propose to briefly discuss some of the more 
prominent ones.
4.1 A priori philosophical objections
One sort of objection is not so much directed at CCMs as the metaphysics of mind with which 
they are associated. Specifically, such arguments purport to show on broadly a priori grounds 
that CCTM is false. Perhaps the most well- known of these objections is Searle’s Chinese Room 
argument, which is sometimes taken to show that CCTM is false because performing the 
right computations is insufficient for such cognitive capacities as understanding. The argument 
proceeds via a thought experiment:
A native English speaker who knows no Chinese [is] locked in a room full of boxes 
of Chinese symbols (a database) together with a book of instructions for manipu-
lating the symbols (the program). Imagine that people outside the room send in other 
Chinese symbols which, unknown to the person in the room, are questions in Chinese 
(the input). And imagine that by following the instructions in the program the man 
in the room is able to pass out Chinese symbols which are correct answers to the 
questions (the output).
(Searle, 1999)
From outside it seems the system understands Chinese. But according to Searle, no matter what 
program the man executes, he won’t know what the symbols mean. Thus mastery of syntactic 
operations – of the program – is insufficient for semantics; and since understanding a sentence 
requires a grasp of what the sentence means, running a program is insufficient for understanding 
as well. Further, Searle maintains that the conclusion generalizes. What’s true of natural language 
understanding is also true for cognition more generally. Running a program, no matter how 
good, is insufficient for cognition.
The critical discussion surrounding Searle’s argument is too large to consider in detail 
here. (See Searle, 1980, and responses; and, Preston and Bishop, 2002, for further discussion.) 
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It should be noted, however, that even if Searle is correct about the inadequacy of CCTM, it 
is far from clear that this would render classical modeling scientifically moribund. For as we 
saw earlier, the two are logically independent. In addition, it is not obvious that Searle’s argu-
ment undermines CCTM. One common response is that, as an objection to CCTM, it misses 
the mark. Classicists do not claim that executing the right program is, by itself, sufficient for 
thought. This would require the acceptance of a claim that classicists routinely deny: that com-
putational role – the way the program uses a representation – determines its meaning. Rather, 
what classicists maintain is that cognitive processes are computational processes operating on 
semantically evaluable representations, whilst leaving open – indeed frequently endorsing – the 
option that semantic properties are determined by something other than computational role, 
such as causal relations to the environment (Fodor, 1990). Thus according to this response, the 
conclusion of Searle’s argument is wholly compatible with the truth of CCTM.
4.2 Arguments from mathematics
A second family of objections seeks to draw out implications for the classical paradigm from 
well- known results in mathematics – most famously Gödel’s incompleteness theorems (Gödel, 
1934; Lucas, 1961; Penrose, 1989). These arguments take a variety of forms; but the general idea 
is that the mathematical result implies limitations on computational systems, which the human 
mind allegedly exceeds. In the case of Gödel’s results, the limitation is, roughly, that for any formal 
system – such as a classical computer – which is both consistent and capable of expressing the 
truths of arithmetic, there will be truths that are not provable in the system. Further, it is argued 
that since we are capable of appreciating such truths, human minds are not classical computers.
Again, this sort of argument has generated an extensive literature. (For an overview, see 
Franzén, 2005.) Once more, I restrict myself to two comments. First, even if sound, it is unclear 
how severe the consequences for the classical paradigm would be. This is because extant math-
ematical arguments, even if sound, would only show that some human cognitive capacities 
exceed those of computers. Yet this is wholly compatible with most of our capacities being 
amenable to classical modeling.
Second, the extant mathematical arguments invariably depend on empirical assumptions 
regarding the extent of our cognitive powers. But as many commentators have noted, these 
assumptions are at best highly idealized (Shapiro, 1998; 2003). Why, for example, suppose that we 
can always see whether or not a given formalized theory is consistent, or that we are capable of for-
mulating our own Gödel sentence? It is, to put it mildly, unobvious that these are powers we possess.
4.3 Explanatory limitations
A third family of criticisms maintains that the classical paradigm lacks the resources to explain 
various important psychological phenomena. In some cases, the “objection” consists of little 
more than drawing attention to an obviously complex psychological phenomenon, and per-
suasively asserting that no mere computer model could explain, or exhibit, such a capacity. 
Claims regarding the prospects of modeling creativity often have this flavor (Boden, 2004). In 
other cases, the focus is on phenomenally conscious states – such as, perceptual experiences 
or emotions – where there is, in Nagel’s memorable phrase, “something that it is like to be” 
in those states (Nagel, 1974). The claim, in brief, is that classical models cannot provide a sat-
isfactory account of how organisms can have such states because phenomenal properties are 
not plausibly characterized in terms of computational or functional roles (Haugeland, 1989; 
Chalmers, 2004).
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The above concerns are seldom met with consternation by proponents of the classical para-
digm. In the case of creativity, whatever the ultimate prospects for a satisfactory computational 
explanation, it should be unsurprising that no such account currently exists, since we lack good 
explanations of the prosaic cognitive capacities on which creativity depends. If we currently 
lack good explanations of humdrum cognition, why on earth would we expect to possess good 
explanations for exceptional cognition?
In the case of conscious experience and emotion, researchers are similarly unperturbed, 
though for different reasons. For in these cases, many classicists already accept the criticism. 
Though some brave theorists suggest that a computational account of phenomenal conscious-
ness might be in the offing (McDermott, 2001), a more typical response is to construe classicism, 
not as an approach to all mental phenomena, but only to what we might loosely term the “cog-
nitive mind”. On such a view, phenomenal consciousness as such is simply not a plausible target 
for classical modeling.
In contrast to the above, the final example of a putative explanatory limitation that I discuss 
here is of genuine concern to classical researchers. This is because it appears to challenge the 
prospects of modeling some of the core phenomena of cognitive science – reasoning, planning, 
and learning, for example. The issue in question is often subsumed under the heading of the 
frame problem, and concerns our ability to determine what information is relevant to the tasks we 
perform (Ford and Pylyshyn, 1996). In particular, when making plans or revising our beliefs, 
we somehow manage to identify what information is relevant to the task at hand and ignore 
the rest. How is this “relevance sensitivity” to be explained in classical terms? It is implausible 
that we survey all our beliefs since such a strategy would require more time and computational 
power than we possess. Some more computationally feasible process is required. Yet many doubt 
such a process can be specified in classical terms. It has been suggested, for example, that rele-
vance is unlikely to be explicable in classical terms because it is a holistic property of thought, in 
roughly the sense that the relevance of a given thought depends on a broad array of “surrounding 
conditions”, such as one’s background beliefs and intentions (Fodor, 2001; Haugeland, 1989).
Conclusion
In this chapter, I  outlined the core aspects of classical computational models, enumerated 
their main virtues, and provided brief illustrations, both historical and contemporary. Further, 
I briefly discussed the relationship between classical modeling, and a range of associated ideas; 
and I sketched some of the more common objections to the classical approach. Although the 
cognitive sciences have changed dramatically since the early work of Newell and Simon, clas-
sical modeling retains a significant role in contemporary research.
Notes
 1 Two terminological points. First, talk of “models” is relatively recent. More typically, early exponents of 
classical modeling spoke of programs as “theories” or “explanations” as opposed to models. Moreover, in 
recent years, “classical computation” is most typically used by computer scientists in contradistinction to 
quantum computation (Yu et al., 2002). On this use of “classical”, computational systems that would be 
categorized as non- classical by cognitive scientists – e.g. connectionist models – are classical (i.e. non- 
quantum) systems.
 2 Of course, algorithms satisfy a number of constraints: (a) each step in the procedure is moronic in that 
it requires no ingenuity or intelligence to carry out; (b) no insight or ingenuity is required to determine 
what the next step in the procedure is; and (c) if each step is followed exactly, the procedure is guaran-
teed to produce some determinate outcome in a finite number of steps.
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 3 Of course, the model, qua program, is typically run on a serial computer. However, this is also true of 
PDP models.
 4 Roughly put, the rules of the logical system are used to specify the function in intension that is computed 
in the course of performing a given inferential task.
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